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Structural Change in Higher Education:
Implications for Research
David B. Schweikhardt’
The political and economic environment
in which agricultural research is conducted is
changing. The methods of funding research are
changing, food markets are international in scope,
and the public is demanding greater accountability
in higher education. These trends are creating
new tensions within the agricultural research
system, and the heightening of these tensions
requires that a new equilibrium be established
between the system’s public mission and the
competing public demands on the system
(Danbom). This new equilibrium will determine
the structure and performance of the agricultural
research system in the coming decade,
Issues in Agricultural Research Funding
Two major issues dominate most
discussions about research funding: What level of
finding will be available for agricultural research
and what mechanisms will be used to allocate
these resources? The real rate of growth in
agricultural research funding at the state
agricultural experiment stations has slowed in
recent years. Real expenditures for research grew
by 1.6’% per year between 1979 and 1990,
compared to a real growth rate of 5.50/. per year
during 1970 to 1979. State appropriations
constituted approximately 60% of total
expenditures throughout this period, while federal
finds from the USDA declined from 22% of total
expenditures in the early 1970’s to 180/. in recent
years. Federal funds from other sources have
remained at 10O/.of total expenditures during this
period, and industry funds have increased from
5% in the early 1970’s to 8’?40in recent years
(Schweikhardt and Whims).
Total finding per scientist year has
grown at 0.7% annually in real terms since 1979
(figure 1). Federal funding from USDA-CSRS
sources has remained at $25,000 per scientist year
for the past 20 years. Funding from state
appropriations has experienced a small amount of
growth since 1982, but this growth has only
managed to return total finding to its 1979 level.
A more significant change -- a change in
how USDA funds are allocated to the
experiment stations -- has also occurred during
the past 20 years. The relative importance of the
formula finding allocation mechanism has
decreased since 1970, and the importance of
special grants and competitive grants has
increased during this period. i In 1970, nearly
98’?40of CSRS funds were allocated to the
experiment stations through the formula finding
system. By 1992 this share had declined to soy.,
with special grants and competitive grants each
accounting for approximately 25% of USDA
funding to the states. Real formula finding per
scientist year has declined by 30/. per year since
1982, while special grant funds per scientist year
have grown by 8’?4.per year (figure 2).
The four regions of the U.S. received an
approximately equal dollar value of special grants
per scientist year throughout most of the 1980’s
(figure 3), but the distribution of competitive
grants across regions is much more variable
figure 4). This outcome is understandable when
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the allocation mechanisms used in these programs
are considered. Special grants are allocated in the
Congressional appropriations process, and
competing political demands can be expected to
result in a reasonably equal distribution of such
grants across regions. Competitive grants, on the
other hand, are allocated by disciplinary peers
through a peer review process, and available
evidence suggests that a wide variation exists in
institutions’ ability to obtain competitive grants.
In 1989, for example, twelve states obtained over
60% of the total competitive grants obtained by
ail experiment stations in the U.S. (Office of
Technology Assessment, 1992, p. 414). As a
result, it should be expected that there would be
much greater variation in the distribution of
competitive grants across geographic regions than
exists for special grants.The establishment of the
National Research Initiative competitive grants
program will accelerate the growth in competitive
grants funding and may widen the funding
disparity between those institutions capable of
obtaining competitive grants and those less able to
attract such funds.
The use of Congressionally earmarked
special grants to finance research has become an
increasingly contmtious policy issue as both the
number of earmarked grants and the total dollar
value of such grants have increased rapidly in
recent years (figure 5) (Marshall; Congressional
Research Service, 1992a and 1992b; Savage;
Cordes, 1989a and 1989b), Critics of special
grants view such grants as politically allocated
funding distributed without regard to scientific
quality. Defenders contend that special grants
provide a means of directing research resources to
problems faced by research users and see the
legislative process as an additional means by
which users can articulate their preferences for
research about relevant problems (Chubin and
Hackett, pp. 153-162; Browning).
What is really interesting to ponder,
however, is the question of why we have seen
such growth in special grants in recent years,
There are at least two possible explanations. The
first is that this growth is a consequence of a
breakdown in the research system. Research users
have found that the legislative process is more
responsive to their problems than is the
agricultural research system. According to this
view, the growth in special grants is a symptom
of larger problems in the management of the
agricultural research system and the failure of the
system to respond to the needs of research users.
A alternative explanation is that interest
groups and/or experiment station administrators
are simply making a rational calculation in
bypassing traditional funding mechanisms and
seeking special grants as a means of gaining
additional funding. Interest groups or
administrators know that the odds of gaining a
significant increase in formula funds are slim and,
even if such an increase were forthcoming from
Congress, each state would receive a small
increase by the time it was divided among all
states. Consequently, it is rational for each state
to seek special grants that it can claim as its own
rather than pursue an increase in formula funding
that will yield a smaller increase in funding for its
efforts.z Regardless of what has caused the
growth in special grants, the use of special grants
will remain a contentious policy issue in future
years,
As more federal funds have been
allocated through competitive and special grants,
the federal government’s effort at matching state
appropriations with formula funds has declined.
In the parlance of public finance theory, the Hatch
and McIntire-Stennis programs are matching
grants -- the federal government matches each
dollar appropriated by the states with a dollar of
federal funds (up to the limit imposed by the
allocation formula). Public finance theory
suggests that matching grants should be used to
finance a good such as agricultural research which
creates significant benefit spillovers outside the
state in which the research is conducted (Boadway
and Wildasin; Schweikhardt), and many observers
believe that the states’ inability to capture the full
benefits of research has caused underinvestment in
agricultural research (Ruttan; Bonnen, 1985).
Empirical evidence suggests that 33 to 66% of the
benefits of agricultural research spill across state
borders (Evenson, Waggoner and Ruttan),
indicating that agricultural research should be
funded through a matching grant program with
the federal government matching each
state dollar with somewhere between 50142 Schweikhardt: Structural Change in Higher Educutinn
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cents to $2.00 of federal funds. The federal
government’s matching effort in financing
research through formula funds has declined from
37 federal cents per state dollar in 1971 to 17
federal cents per state dollar in 1990 (figure 6).
This decline in the federal government’s effort at
matching state expenditures for research indicates
that an increasing share of the cost of agricultural
research is being funded by the states. As a
result, states are receiving less compensation for
the research benefit spi}lovers they create and
have less of an incentive to invest in a nationally
optimal level of agricultural research, thereby
perpetuating, or perhaps worsening, the
underinvestment problem.
When considering the role of formula,
competitive, and special grants in financing
agricultural research, we should also consider the
administrative and managerial costs of these
funding mechanisms. Agricultural research is
unlike other fields of science because research








attention to the particular
climatic or agronomic factors that define the
unique problems of a particular production region
(Ruttan, p. 250-251). As a result, resource
allocation decisions in agricultural research require
a significantly higher level of information about
local problems and conditions than do other fields
of science (Schultz, p. 16),
Economists define the cost of making
decisions -- including the cost of collecting and
analyzing information and the cost of negotiating
group decisions -- as transaction costs
(Williamson). Because agricultural research
decisions require more information about local
problems and conditions than do decisions in most
other fields of science, the transaction costs of
soliciting and transferring information from
research users to research managers are higher
than other fields of science, One must ask: Mat
are the transaction costs of operating a
competitive grant system versus the costs of
operating a formula funded system, and how areJ. Agr. and Applied Econ,, Jnly, 1993
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these costs distributed across research users,
scientists, and administrators? Furthermore, are
the costs of acquiring and transferring information
from research users to decision makers under a
competitive grant system a serious obstacle to the
establishment of a research agenda that is in
conceit with the needs of research users?
Similarly, what are the transaction costs generated
by the pursuit of special grants? One advantage
of a decentralized agricultural research system
supported primarily by state appropriations and
formula funds is that such a system minimizes the
transaction costs of transferring knowledge about
problems from research users to administrators.
At the same time, such a system allows research
administrators to communicate with users about
emerging research opportunities relevant to users’
problems,
Whether these transaction costs are a
serious barrier to the operation of a centralized
competitive grant program is a question worth
considering. If so, can a competitive grant
program operate in a manner that avoids an
excessive level of transaction costs and a
worsening of the information transfer problem?
The answers to these questions are unclear, but
these questions are relevant to future decisions on
research policy and deserve investigation by
agricultural economists.
In a similar vein, what are the costs of
grantsmanship -- defined as the costs or writing
and reviewing grants -- under each of these
funding mechanisms? These costs could also be
considered part of the transaction costs of
operating the research enterprise. The general
science community is increasingly concerned
about the rising costs of grantsmanship in their
competitive grant programs. Twenty-two percent
of the proposals submitted to the USDA
competitive grants program were funded in 1992
(Abelson), and a similar acceptance rate is
reported by other funding agencies (Chubin and
Hackett, p. 25-28), Were the scientist years
embedded in rest of these proposals a sunk cost of144 Schweikhardt; Strmvural Change In Higher Educutmn
operating a competitive grant system and, if so,
how much of a cost does it represent? Once
again, these are research questions that should be
examined by agricultural economists.3
The issue is not whether one these
mechanisms should be the sole mechanism used to
finance agricultural research, but is instead a
question of what mix of these mechanisms can
most effectively accomplish the varied objectives
of the agricultural research system. This issue can
only be addressed by considering the following
questions:
What incentives does each mechanism
create for state support of research and
how do each of these mechanisms affect
research funding at the state level?
What are the transaction costs of
operating each funding mechanism, who
bears these costs, and how do these costs
affect communications between research
users, scientists, and administrators?
What is the capacity of each of these
mechanisms to allocate resources to
emerging fields of science with long-term
importance?
What is the capacity of each of these
mechanisms to respond to problems of
immediate importance to research users?
Finally, it should be noted that the
changing status of intergovernmental relations in
the U.S. may be affecting agricultural research
funding at the state level. Program mandates
established by judicial decisions or federal
legislation are consuming an increasing share of
state budgets, leaving less funding for non-
mandated program (Conlan; Hamilton and Wells,
pp. 87-9Q Stiles).4 As Martha Derthick has
observed:




means to achieve them,
will try to conscript the
states. That is, it will
give them orders as if
they were administrative
agents of the national
government while
expecting state officials
and electorates to bear
whatever costs ensue
(Derthick, p. 36).
The implication of such trends should be
clear. The 1990’s will be an era of fierce
competition for state budget resources, during
which agricultural research could be at a political
disadvantage relative to both mandated programs
and programs with wider constituencies.
The International Scope of Food Markets
I would add only one comment to
Schuh’s discussion of the impact of
internationalization on higher education. When
markets are international in scope, research will
often create benefits for consumers (in the form of
lower prices) or producers (if they can adopt the
results) outside the nation conducting the research.
As a result, the same spillover problem that exists
among states within the U.S. will occur among
nations and research will be underfunded because
an individual country that cannot capture the full
benefits of research. The growth of this problem,
prompted by the integration of food markets at the
international level, will require institution
innovations capable of funding cooperative
research efforts on the international level
(Schweikhardt and Bonnen).
Accountability and Productivity
Congress loves action -- it It is now clear that the public will
thrives on policy proclamation demand greater accountability in higher education
and goal-setting -- but it hates during the coming decade, but it is not yet clear
bureaucracy and taxes, which are how accountability will be defined. This much is
instruments of action..., [As a clear: Anyone in academia who believes that
result], there is a danger that accountability will be defined simply as
Congress, in striving to close the preventing recurrences of the “Stanford overheadJ. Agr. and Applied Econ., JIdy, 1993 145
case” is not paying attention to the public debate.
The public is demanding an explanation of how
we do our jobs and what benefits they are
receiving from our research and teaching efforts.
These demands began with the publication of a
series of books on higher education whose general
theme was that professors neglect teaching --
particularly undergraduate teaching -- to focus on
research that is trivial and irrelevant (Sykes;
Anderson). While some will dismiss such attacks
as misinformed, the public is listening to these
critics with great interest. A recent survey
revealed that sixteen states are considering some
form of legislative or administrative policies
governing faculty workloads and productivity
(Mooney; Lively, Mercer and Whitfield).
Researchers within academia have also
begun to examine the output of university
research. A recent study of research citations
revealed that a surprising number of publications
are not cited during the four years after
publication (figure 7), and 5 to 20 percent of all
citations are made by authors citing their own
work (David Hamilton, 1990 and 1991).
Although such results may be sensitive to the data
base employed to conduct this research, these
results are reason to ponder a question now on the
public’s mind: Of what value is our work to the
public? Our response to this question and, more
importantly, our willingness to focus our research
efforts on the real problems faced by private and
public decision makers, will be critical in
determining the level of financial support we
receive during the coming decade.
We are also learning more about the
productivity of alternative research funding
mechanisms. Recent studies reveal that there are
differences in the outputs of the various research
funding mechanisms (table 1). Research funded
through competitive grants tends to generate
outputs that are more likely to be read by
disciplinary peers, while research funded by
formula funds or other funding mechanisms is
more likely to generate outputs relevant to
research users among the general public. This
suggests -- as do previous empirical studies of the
returns to research and the interaction of
disciplinary and applied resea~h (Evenson,
Waggoner and Ruttan) -- that it is critically
important that a balance be maintained between
disciplinary and applied research and between the
mechanisms used to finance research.
When we examine the productivity of the
land grant system, we must also be concerned
about the integration of our research and extension
priorities. Henry Wadsworth compared the
priorities of the National Extension Initiatives with
those of National Agricultural Research
Committee and found that nearly half of the
extension priorities had no counterpart in the
research priorities (Wadsworth; Office of
Technology Assessment, 1990). James Bonnen
(1992) notes that the results of the Social Science
Agricultural Agenda Project found a similar
dissonance between extension and research
priorities in the social sciences, Are these
observations an indication that the problems faced
by research users and the research opportunities
seen by scientists and administrators are not being
articulated through the system? If so, what is the
cause of such dissonance and how can it be
remedied? The coming decade will see a
continuing effort to define the public’s
expectations for university research and the
faculty’s responsibility to meet those expectations.
Conclusion
We are entering an era when every aspect
of higher education will face increased public
scrutiny, Those institutions willing to serve the
needs of their states will be rewarded with the
resources to do the job, but we will gain these
resources only if we earn them by delivering
knowledge that is relevant to the real problems
faced by public and private decision makers.
Slow growth in our resource base will require the
establishment of a well defined set of research
priorities that addresses these problems, This
pressure to define our research mission will
probably lead to increased heterogeneity among
departments of agricultural economics as each
department seeks to establish a market niche that
satisfies unique local, regional or national
opportunities.
The ongoing debates over the future
direction of higher education and of this
profession are healthy and, I believe, will
ultimate]y lead to a clarification of the social
contract between our institutions and the public146 Schweikhardt: Structural Change in Higher Education
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we serve. Many of the problems facing decision problems are to be addressed, We can succeed in
makers, including many of the issues facing the capturing these opportunities if we retain our
agricultural research system, will require commitment to relevance in research,
contributions from agricultural economists if these
Table 1. Mean Values of Selected State Agricultural Experiment Station Outputs by Type of Funding
Grant
Hatch Competitive Other
Citations per article’ 1,70 3.98b 1.82
Articles per grant 2.47 2.14 2.24
Weighted articles per grant’ 4.83 8,33’ 4.74
Journal publications per grant 4,70 4.52 3.68
Weighted publications per grant’ 7.07 10,62d 6,58
Bulletins per grant 0.35 o.09b 0.28
‘Weighted by number of citations. Publications includes articles submitted, articles published, articles in
press, and abstracts in peer reviewed journals,
bSignificantly different from other two groups at 9570 confidence level.
‘Significantly different from other two groups at 94% confidence level.
‘Significantly different from other two groups at 92% confidence level.
Source: Marie Walsh, “Factors Affecting the Cost and Productivity of Biotechnology Research at the
State Agricultural Experiment Stations,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, in progress. Cited
in Office of Technology Assessment, 1992, p. 423.J. Agr. and Applied Econ., Jnly, 1993 147
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Endnotes
1. Formula funded grants allocate research funds to the states based on a legislatively-mandated
formula. Competitive grants are allocated by a panel of scientific peers who select research projects
based on the quality of the research proposals submitted to the review panel. Special grants are
allocated by legislative mandate in Congressional appropriations bills and provide funding for a specific
research project at a specific institution (National Research Council, 1989, p, 34).
2. Similar explanations of “rent-seeking” behavior have been used to analyze a wide variety of political
decisions (Mueller, pp. 242-244), but have not been used to analyze earmarking of research funds. It
should be noted, however, that simple rent-seeking theories cannot provide a complete explanation of
the growth in special grants. It has always been true that an individual state could gain an advantage by
seeking special grants outside the formula funding system, yet growth in these grants did not accelerate
until recent years. Consequently, other factors must have changed to permit this growth to occur.
Penner and Hardin both suggest that the decentralization of power in Congress, combined with a
weakening of the Congressional leadership’s control of the budget process, have provided greater access
for interest groups seeking increased spending. This greater access increases the probability that such
rent-seeking behavior, including the pursuit of special grants for research, will succeed. Such behavior
is visible in the establishment of international agricultural trade centers financed by special grants.
Congress passed legislation supporting such centers, but did not establish a means of selecting the
recipients of these funds. After some centers had been established through special grants, Congress was150 Sch weikhardt: Structural Change in Higher Education
inundated with proposals for centers, including proposals from universities that had previously refused to
accept earmarked grants. As a result, Congress was forced to halt the funding of additional centers until
its staff could review the requests. Critics of earmarked grants continue to contend that such reviews do
not provide an adequate assessment of scientific quality (Cordes, 1989a and 1989b).
3. Existing estimates of the cost of writing andreviewing research grants suggest that such costs could
be significant. Some estimates indicate that asmuchas 50% of research resources are spent on writing,
reviewing, and reporting on grants (Office of Technology Assessment, 1990, p, 22), Other estimates
indicate that one dollar of resources is spent to obtain three dollars in grant funding (Richards and
Davis). No empirical estimates of the costs of pursuing special grants are available. Further research is
needed to assess the administrative and transaction costs associated with all three funding mechanisms.
4. Medicaid and corrections are the two fastest growing items in the budgets of many states. Much of
the increase in these categories is a result of legislative or judicial mandates beyond the control of state
legislatures (Gold, p. 111).